Intersex conditions manifest in atypical physical sex and raise important theological questions about the significance of human sex. This paper examines the significance of Jesus's sex, suggesting that Christian theologies grounded in his undisputed maleness require rethinking in light of intersex. This includes the insistence by some Christians that priests must be male and not female because Jesus was male. The paper draws on constructive Christian theologies, including that of Karl Barth, and interviews with intersex Christians. It concludes that, while all humans are irreducibly sexed, sex is a human rather than a divine attribute and that maleness is not a necessary carrier of Jesus's soteriological capacity. Human sex does not in itself image God, but is a channel for other divine characteristics, such as generativity and relationality, imaged in humans. Maleness is not a quality of God imaged in Jesus, so also need not be a quality of Jesus which Christian priests "represent."
berty, develop breasts and hips. The vast majority are brought up as girls and do not consider that there is anything male about them. Less common conditions include those where the external genitalia appear male but there are some invisible female characteristics: for example, ovarian tissue as well as or instead of testicular tissue (as in some individuals with ovotestes, formerly called "true hermaphroditism"; and in some XX fetuses with congenital adrenal hyperplasia, who have male-looking external genitalia and female reproductive organs), or XX cells in the same body as XY cells (as in genetic mosaicism).
Intersex conditions causing unusual genitalia affect about 1 in 2,500 people.
1 However, it is much harder to determine how many people have "invisible" intersex conditions. Many such conditions cause no physical problems and may be discovered by chance through medical examinations for other reasons, or not at all. Some people undoubtedly live their entire lives never knowing that they have an intersex condition.
Intersex raises important theological questions about the significance of human sex. If not everyone is male or female, and if it is possible to be intersex and not know it, what does this mean for theological-anthropological assertions about what human sex signifies in cosmic terms? In this paper, I focus in particular on questions about the significance of Jesus's sex. If it is theoretically possible that Jesus, in common with some other humans, was intersex and that this was not known, do theologies grounded in his maleness require rethinking? What are the implications for discussions about the sex of other humans, and the insistence by some Christians that priests must be male and not female because Jesus was male?
The Maleness of Jesus
Debates about women bishops in my own denomination, the Church of England, sometimes repeat arguments made by those who opposed women becoming priests at all: since a priest stands in persona Christi, a priest, like Christ, must be male. In this account, it is ontologically impossible for women to be priests. E. L. Mascall, an opponent to women's ordination, argued in 1978, Priesthood belongs to Christ as the Son of the eternal Father. . . . The fact that he has only one sex, and that the male, does not make his humanity incomplete. Humanity belongs to him fully in the mode of masculinity; he does not need to be a hermaphrodite 2 in order to be fully human, any more than he needs to be a eunuch to avoid favouring one sex over the other. And because the ordained priest is not exercising a priesthood of his own but is the agent and instrument through which Christ is exercising his priesthood, he too must be male. 3 A submission to the Church of England House of Bishops' 2001 working party on women in the episcopate from a church in Reading held, "In presiding at the celebration of the Lord's Supper or Mass, the priest, acting in persona Christi, sacramentally re-enacts the saving sacrifice of Calvary. . . . At the altar, the priest represents Christ the bridegroom, and this sacramental sign is lost entirely when the celebrant is female." 4 A submission from the Anglo-Catholic traditionalist group Forward in Faith argued, "The Fathers and the Schoolmen were unanimously agreed . . . that the maleness of Christ is Christologically significant. They affirmed that he was the Messiah, the Son of David; and that he was the Son of the Father. They rightly understood those categories to be male and to be located in the Jewishness of the chosen culture of our redemption." 5 In these accounts, Jesus's maleness is not incidental, but something specific in which his sacerdotal and soteriological capacity inheres. For Mascall, priesthood belongs to Christ because of his maleness; therefore, human priesthood is also uniquely male. In the Forward in Faith submission, Jesus's maleness is significant because maleness in a first-century Jewish context underpins inheritance rights, important to Jesus's status as God's Son.
Jesus's maleness is also widely discussed in feminist theologies. For Elizabeth Johnson, maleness in itself is unproblematic. However, power structures and hegemonies attached to maleness distort God's mission of equality, love, and justice. 6 The Cross sums up Jesus's kenosis of his male privilege and power: "On this reading Jesus's maleness is prophecy announcing the end of patriarchy."
7 For Rosemary Radford Ruether, "the maleness of Jesus has no ultimate significance." 8 Her famous enquiry "Can a male savior save women?" evoked questions about whether arguments that whatever is not assumed cannot be redeemed applies to gender, or whether (as Mascall implies) Jesus's humanity "covers" women and men alike. 9 More recently, Tina Beattie has suggested that Jesus's maleness is soteriologically significant because male sin disproportion- But what if Jesus's maleness is not actually indisputable and incontrovertible? Theologians usually assume that there is no question about Jesus's historic biological maleness, whether or not they subsequently hold that priests must themselves be male. However, as I have noted elsewhere, It is not possible to assert with any degree of certainty that Jesus was male as we now define maleness. There is no way of knowing for sure that Jesus did not have one of the intersex conditions which would give him a body which appeared externally to be unremarkably male, but which might nonetheless have had some 'hidden' female physical features. . . . There is simply no way of telling at this juncture whether Jesus was an unremarkably male human being, or someone with an intersex condition who had a male morphology as far as the eye could see but may or may not also have had XX chromosomes or some female internal anatomy.
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I am not suggesting that Jesus did not live as a man, interact with others as a man, identify as a man, and so on. But that is not the same thing as saying he was male in biological terms. It is unlikely that Jesus had visibly atypical genital anatomy of the kind that some intersex people do, because it would probably have been noticed at birth and may have rendered a ritual circumcision difficult (though Jewish law requires that someone with atypical genitalia be circumcised if possible). 13 However, since there are also "invisible" intersex conditions with no external genital ambiguity, it is not impossible that Jesus had a condition of this kind.
So what would it matter if Jesus had had an intersex condition? What would it mean for Jesus's humanity and divinity? What would it mean for theological 10 arguments invested in Jesus's maleness that never take it to be anything other than obvious and incontrovertible? These are important questions not because it is particularly likely that Jesus was intersex-on the contrary, it is statistically extremely unlikely-but because Jesus's ostensibly incontrovertible maleness is imbued with such a great weight of theological signification that, in turn, underlies the exclusion of women from serving as priests, bishops, and other ministers in some Christian denominations. If Jesus's maleness is not so unproblematic after all, then a set of justifications for opposing women's priestly and episcopal ministry falls away.
Humanity and Sex
Arguments about Jesus's maleness are sometimes grounded in the assertion that for Jesus to be truly human, he must have been sexed. If to be human is to be sexed male or female, than Jesus had to be one or the other. Many theologians assert that maleness and femaleness alone reflect God's intention for sexed human beings. Any deviation from this pattern is depicted as unfortunate and undesirable. Dennis Hollinger, for example, says, There are sexual anomalies and distortions within the natural state of some human beings. . . . In the medical world this is called an intersex condition. . . . From a theological standpoint we can understand these conditions as results of the fallen condition of our world, including the natural world. . . . We should also understand that such natural sexual conditions and anomalies in no way undermine the creational norms. . . . In a fallen world there will be chaos and confusion that extends even to human sexuality. But the normative structure toward which God calls humanity is not the fallenness of nature; it is, rather, God's created designs. 14 Elsewhere, intersex conditions have been figured as illnesses or diseases that may legitimately be rectified through corrective surgery. 15 In these accounts, "divine givens" are so "given" (and intersex so undesirable) that it is appropriate to reinforce them when another kind of physical sex manifests. 16 Intersex variations might arise in nature; but, add some theologians, this does not make them part of the divine plan: "We need not see all differences as God's mistakes, but we also need not see them all as God's will. The fact that children are born with ambiguous genitals may be incontrovertible evidence that there are not only 14 Could Jesus have been human without a clear male sex, or any clear sex at all? Christian theologies, with their characteristically high account of embodiment and incarnation, cannot disparage human sex without eroding materiality and specificity as goods. It matters, Christian theologians might say, that Jesus had a physical sex, because he was a specific person, and specific persons have specific sexes. Karl Barth works according to this kind of logic when he asserts, "that the Word was made 'flesh' means first and generally that He became man, true and real man, participating in the same human essence and existence, the same human nature and form, the same historicity that we have. God's revelation to us takes place in such a way that everything ascribable to man . . . can now be predicated of God's eternal Son as well."
18 So the question is to what extent it matters how someone is sexed-and whether being sexed other than male or female need be understood as problematic in theological-anthropological terms.
Barth, writing in the mid-twentieth century, makes reference to androgyne figures in Greek mythology and Indian religions. 19 However, he does not give any sense of engagement with questions raised by real, nonmythological intersex bodies (unsurprisingly, given that intersex was openly discussed very little prior to the rise of the intersex activism movement in the early 1990s). Although he speaks of people who wish to transcend their sexed nature, aspiring "to sexless or bi-sexual humanity," this is rooted in an assumption that humans can only be male or female and that to deny their specificity via appeals to social genderlessness would be to deny their humanity. 20 He says, "since man has been created by God as male or female, and stands before God in this Either-Or, everything that God wills and requires of him is contained by implication in this situation, and the question of good and evil in his conduct is measured by it. God . . . requires that he should be genuinely and fully the one or the other, male or female." 21 For Barth, the crucial point is that the differences between human beings must not be elided: first, because to do so would be to deny individuals' specificity; and second, because denying sex would be denying incarnate human nature.
However, it is ironic that Barth, who rejected natural theologies and believed knowledge of God came about only through God's self-revelation in Christ, seems to draw cosmic conclusions from what he believes are self-evident "natural" facts (i.e., that all humans are male or female). Indeed, Graham Ward comments that, in Barth's anthropological treatment of humans, he "defines their ethical and social vocation in terms of their biology alone. It is as if he returns to a natural theology his whole theological system is set up to refute."
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Because Barth does not distinguish between sex and gender-because he understands maleness and masculinity to go ineluctably together-he believes one cannot reject one's existence as a man or woman without also rejecting the irrefutable fact of one's sex. However, interestingly, precisely because he is not aware that human sex can be other than male or female, he does not overwork the trope of biology itself as the a priori ground on which masculinity and femininity are built. In this way, he may be closer than he would ever have suspected to the feminist philosophers whose work he briefly refutes. He considers that the way in which men act and women respond echoes the way God acts and humans respond, 23 but he does not pin this to a biologist assertion about human reproductive capacity or male initiation and female response in sexual intercourse (though the Church of England's bishops did so several decades later).
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Maleness and femaleness per se are less important to Barth than masculinity and femininity are, though of course he does not distinguish them in these terms. Indeed, he says, "it is a question of the whole man and not merely of the use which he makes or does not make of his physical sexual organs." 25 To recap: human sex is an appropriately creaturely reminder of humans' status as human. 26 For Barth, not acknowledging the creaturehood bound up with sex is problematic. To be human is, irreducibly, to be sexed. However, I wonder whether Barth himself would maintain, in the face of the existence of intersex in the contemporary world, that sex could manifest only as male or female. What Barth is getting at, and what really seems theologically significant in his account, is specificity: existence in, and interaction with God and other humans, through sexed particularity. It does not occur to Barth that specific sex can be other than male or female, so he cannot "reject" manhood and womanhood because, in his logic, this is to reject creaturehood itself. For us, however, 24 "In terms of our relationship to God we are essentially 'female-like' and feminine and he is 'male-like' and masculine. God always has the initiative and our duty is to respond. Because, psychologically and symbolically and, to an important extent, biologically, taking the initiative is male, it was therefore appropriate that the Word was incarnate as a male human being and not as a female human being. The particularity of maleness assumed in the incarnation and taken into the Godhead signifies divine initiative." Central Board Being a Christian helped me accept myself, because I felt that God made me. So I probably wouldn't be as okay with the whole thing, and relaxed about the whole thing if I didn't feel that there was purposes for things. And that there was a greater power . . . at work . . . I feel really liberated because the way I feel is, to God, it doesn't really matter whether I am a man or a woman. It just matters that I am who I am, who he made me. (Poppy, Roman Catholic) Several suggested intersex had specific spiritual and social benefits:
Having an intersex condition invites you to step out of a world view that is certain and predictable to seeing that many of our assumptions as human beings fall far short of certitude . . . Having an [intersex] condition can make it easier to embrace the joy of individuality and not have to feel the need to be like everyone else. (Vanessa, Roman Catholic) I can really embrace my being intersex and seeing the spiritual gifts that come from that and I don't believe it's an accident that I've been born Some identified as male or female, and others as distinctively intersex or "in between," but there was no sense that their intersex could not be understood as a good creation of God.
If other humans' ambiguous sex does not compromise their humanity or represent a deviation from God's intention but exists as another nonmoral possibility alongside maleness and femaleness, then the goodness of Jesus's humanity need also not be compromised by the possibility of intersex. Having an intersex condition might, theoretically, have compromised Jesus's capacity to procreate: many intersex people are infertile. However, Jesus's supposed perfected humanity is not deemed to have been compromised by the fact that he did not marry or have biological children. The existence and materiality of Jesus's sex matter. But, I suggest, it does not necessarily matter what that sex was. Jesus's maleness is not inherently soteriologically significant: his humanity, including its specifically sexed nature, is. Jesus shares with all humans the quality of having a specific sex, and his solidarity with other humans inheres in this specificity and particularity. Likewise, all those who minister as priests and bishops resemble Jesus in simultaneously being specifically, distinctly sexed and particular, and in sharing this specifically sexed status with others no matter what that specific sex is.
Divinity and Sex
If Jesus's putative intersexuality need not necessarily compromise his humanity, then what about his divinity? In many respects, this is easier: maleness and sex in general are human attributes not divine ones. In Chalcedonian terms, there can be no mixing of, or confusion between, Jesus's divine and human natures. Nonetheless, there has been, comments Johnson, "a certain leakage of Jesus's human maleness into the divine nature, so that maleness appears to be of the essence of the God made known in Christ."
29 She notes, "as visible image of the invisible God, the human man Jesus is used to tie the knot between maleness and divinity very tightly." 30 But God is not male. Maleness and femaleness are not qualities belonging to God. God is made incarnate in and through sexed bodies but also transcends and exceeds them. It is possible to claim human sex as part of what images God in humans without claiming that sex itself is a quality of God. Human sex is a means by which humans may be generative, relational, and loving, like God. But this likeness is not an exact similarity: God creates and generates without sex, and humans' capacity for creativity and generation is not uniquely linked to their sexuality (humans also do not create and generate only through sex). In Christian theology, God relates to Godself within the Trinity sexlessly, and God's relationships to the creation are not sexed as those of humans are. Jesus's divinity-his similarity and pereichoretic relationality with God-does not depend on his maleness, because his sex belongs to him as human, not as divine.
In the context of the women-priests debate, Robert Pesarchick glosses Hans Urs von Balthasar's account of priesthood, 32 saying that, for Balthasar, "the ministerial priesthood is commissioned to represent . . . Christ as Christ is commissioned to represent the Father. Just as the maleness of Jesus is intrinsic to this aspect of his mission/priesthood, so maleness is intrinsic to the ordained priesthood's task of commissioned representation."
33 But Jesus's representation of God cannot include maleness, since God is not male. Priests' representation of Jesus need not therefore have maleness as an irreducible facet, since maleness cannot be part of the divinity of God which Jesus mediates to humans and which priests in turn mediate to the Church.
The problems arise where metaphors of fatherhood and generation in God are conflated with fatherhood and generation in human terms. Beattie expands on this, noting, "Balthasar's Jesus is of necessity a biological male, because he represents God, who is 'the Origin, the Father.' Thus there is-at least implicitly-an identification of the divine fatherhood with masculine sexuality and the male body." 34 She reads Balthasar's essentializing of biological sex, and symbolic designation of creation as "feminine" in relation to a "masculine" Christ-him- self "feminine" in relation to God because he emanates from him-as failing to problematize the association of biological human maleness with divinity and initiation. 35 It is essentially a dead metaphor, which Balthasar and others attempt to revivify retrospectively via imbuing maleness (a human characteristic) with divine significance. Balthasar's appeal to male sexual generation echoes his appeal to the Genesis account in which Eve is taken from Adam's rib: "Both are created by God, but the woman is made from the man."
36 Like Barth, however, Balthasar works from humans backward: he believes it is only possible to be sexed male or female, and his theology of the Church as Bride and Christ as Bridegroom follows from there: "The male body is male throughout, right down to each cell of which it consists, and the female body is utterly female; and this is also true of their whole empirical experience and ego-consciousness. . . . Both share an identical human nature, but at no point does it protrude, neutrally, beyond the sexual difference."
37 But Balthasar's absence of knowledge of bodies not exclusively male or female down to the last cell-like intersex people with genetic mosaicism, who may or may not also have unusual genitalia-leaves him, like Barth, grounding cosmic assertions in "obvious" natural observations now highly questionable in light of intersex. Maleness and femaleness have had a great weight of theological signification brought to bear on them, but much of this may no longer stand if it is acknowledged that male and female are not categories that include the whole of humanity (and are therefore not an unproblematic all-encompassing cipher).
Maleness and femaleness, in Barth, Balthasar, and some who follow them, are taken as including all humanity. As we have seen, this is already problematic because of the intersex exception. Furthermore, however, it fails to recognize the discontinuity between God and humans. Humans image God in many ways, but this is not contingent on their sex, since sex is a channel through which God-reflecting qualities are outworked. In theological-anthropological terms, there is a further interruption because of the cosmic work of Christ, which profoundly alters what it is to be human. Humanness itself is, as David McCarthy Matzko argues, transformed because of God's self-revelation in Jesus: "For Christian theology, human bodiliness is given its essential character through the incarnation. Christ does not simply wear the cloak of an already-complete humanity; on the contrary, the incarnation of God as human flesh constitutes the human body as reconciled to God. This reconciled humanity reveals humanity in its true form." 38 In Jesus, human incarnation, embodiment, and flesh- liness (what Leo Steinberg calls "humanation") is furthered. 39 Bodies "in Christ" do not mean what they meant before. Tropes of inheritance (sometimes appealed to as justification for Jesus's maleness-Sonship) and hierarchy (that is, the assumption that males' and females' distinctness is not merely different, but different in an ordered, males-preceding-and-females-following manner) are disrupted despite the persisting particularity and multiplicity of bodily sex. Indeed, though he might not have known it, this chimes with Barth's assertion in his essay Christ and Adam: "So it is Christ that reveals the true nature of man. Man's nature in Adam is not, as is usually assumed, his true and original nature; it is only truly human at all insofar as it reflects and corresponds to essential human nature as it is found in Christ." 40 What is true of humanity as transformed in Christ is truer than what was true in Adam. I will return to this point in a moment.
Priests and Androgynes
Another argument for Jesus's essential maleness might lie in his roles as symbolic high priest and effective sacrifice (Hebrews 7 NRSV). Would their efficacy be compromised if Jesus were not a veritably male animal, since only male animals were to be sacrificed at Passover? Leviticus 21:21 NRSV states that priests (like sacrificial animals) may not be blemished, and Deuteronomy 23:1 NRSV indicates that no one whose testes have been crushed or penis cut off may be admitted to the assembly. David Tabb Stewart and others note the recognition in the Mishnah of androginos, persons with characteristics of both sexes, and tumtum, whose sex is unknown because their genitals are "hidden." Stewart suggests both these categories are subtly different from the "damaged male." 41 According to Charlotte Elisheva Fonrobert, being tumtum or androginos in Judaism precludes an animal from counting as male and being a legitimate sacrifice; importantly, however, this is to do with readability as male, the external genitals' appearance. 42 Avraham Steinberg concurs, "that which is decisive in Jewish law is only the appearance of the external sex organs and not the chromosomal analysis." 43 Gideon Weitzman confirms that the Talmud Sages determined human sex by external genitalia only, but notes that modern medical technology means that analysis of chromosomes and internal tissues is also now possible and desirable in the treatment of intersex children. 44 In the contemporary Jewish context, then, there is acknowledgment that sex for legal and ritual purposes does not lie in visible genitals alone.
Only those assumed to be male act as priests in the Hebrew Bible. However, that is important: only those assumed to be male. For humans as for sacrificial animals, sex in this context was determined by the visible genitalia (which is why tumtum individuals represented a categorization problem). But maleness (and, indeed, femaleness) is not a stable or unshifting category. It has not been determined by genital appearance alone in every culture or society. It does not always exist incontrovertibly in a given individual from birth to death, as exemplified by those intersex people who have female-looking bodies in childhood and then experience male puberties (as with those who have conditions such as 5-alpha reductase deficiency, brought to wider public notice by Jeffrey Eugenides's 2002 novel Middlesex). 45 Jesus's maleness is assumed important to his symbolic priesthood because it is assumed that all the priests who preceded him were similarly unquestionably male. But their maleness or otherwise was equally contingent on cultural norms and equally distant and impossible to certify in biological terms.
A further argument might be that Jesus's role as "second Adam" in Christian traditions-the one who takes on and redeems the human capacity for sin instituted in the first Adam-necessitates his sharing maleness with the first Adam: either because Adam's sin was somehow linked intrinsically to his maleness, so by association the maleness of Jesus is necessary to redeem it; or because Adam's standing for all humanity resides in his maleness as "representative," covering all humanity.
However, Adam himself was, according to some traditions, not always male, but originally androgynous, with Adam's maleness coming about only at the creation of Eve. A fifth-century midrash, Genesis Rabbah viii, states, "Jeremiah, son of Eleazar, says: God created Adam androgynous, but Samuel, son of Nahman, says, He created him 'double-faced,' then cutting him in twain and forming two backs, one to the one and the other to the second." 46 On account of their being joined in one, God made, it says, man to the image of God. And in case anyone should think it was only the spirit of man that was made, although it was only in the spirit that he was made to the image of God, he made him, it says, male and female (Gn 1:27), to give us to understand that the body was also being made now. Again, in case anyone should suppose that it was made in such a way as to represent each sex in a single person, like those called hermaphrodites who are born occasionally, he shows that he put it in the singular on account of their being joined in one, and because the woman was made from the man. 47 The idea of humans as originally androgynous has been abandoned in subsequent orthodox Christian theology, and recent accounts of human sexuality (such as those released by the Church of England) tend to appeal to the primary, inbuilt either-maleness-or-femaleness of humans, often with concomitant appeals to gender complementarity.
Here, Barth's argument that what is true of humans in Christ is more authentic and somehow more primary than what is true of humans in Adam is significant. It implies that humanity's true nature is to be transformed for life in community, being reconciled with God, humans, and other creatures. "In Christ," human sex is not "over" (humans after Christ are still sexed), but is not significant in the same way. Asserting that sex and gender disappear in Christ, as some scholars have suggested, is attractive. However, it may also be dangerous, especially for women, intersex people, and others whose bodies are easily "disappeared." If sex passes away in the new creation, it is only a small step to saying that sex differences are not good in their own right. Ruether notes that Christian sects with concepts of an androgynous Christ have often reinforced androcentrism; the "lower" female, material element disappears in the ostensibly androgynous Christ, and the rational, male element remains. 48 So it matters that we are sexed and not sexless. But it matters less, for salvation in theological and social life, how we are sexed. Sex persists, but sex as male is not privileged over sex as female or sex otherwise.
Uncertainty and Simultaneity
So far, I have mostly spoken about the implications of the actual, physical body of Jesus. Inevitably, however, the symbolic body of Christ in church and community has also been important. There is a stream within Christianity grounded in Galatians 3:28 (NRSV): "There is no longer male and female . . . in Christ." Many theologians have held back from asserting that the end of 47 sex could happen pre-eschatologically (and, as we have just seen, "ending sex" prematurely may threaten nonmales especially), but this does not mean that changes in understandings of sex cannot occur, nor that sex cannot be affirmed as contingent and penultimate like the other social categories which Paul asserts pass away in Christ. Graham Ward shows that Jesus's cosmic body is transfigured in and through the multiply gendered bodies of those selves and others with whom Christians worship. In the new community, gender signifies differently. 49 Ward's account might not go far enough in addressing what it means to be someone whose bodily sex is in question pre-eschaton, and may, as Virginia Burrus has commented, do too little to disrupt the sexism historically reinscribed through assertions about Christ's maleness. 50 However, Ward does much in acknowledging that sex and gender in the new community are not final arbiters of identity. The ecclesial body of Christ contains both male and female human bodies. In that sense, it is no longer (if it ever was) solely male. Important, however, is that it also contains intersex bodies. The bodies within the Body are not just male and female ones. Differences and particularities in bodies persist: problems and limitations attached to those differences do not.
Barth and Balthasar each, in their different ways, insist on the irreducibility of Jesus's maleness-manhood and, related to it, the irreducible maleness-manhood and femaleness-womanhood of human beings. But a third theological "big B" of twentieth-century German-language theology, Rudolf Bultmann, took another approach.
Bultmann argues, "the facts which historical criticism can verify cannot exhaust, indeed they cannot adequately indicate, all that Jesus means to me. How he actually originated matters little, indeed we can appreciate his significance only when we cease to worry about such questions." 51 For Bultmann, belief in Christ's soteriological power cannot turn on questions about his historical authenticity or details of his historic particularity. We cannot know with certainty, Bultmann remarks, whether Jesus died on a cross and was resurrected: people have believed these things as acts of faith throughout Christian history, and Christians now must do likewise. There will always be risk attached to belief in unverifiable events, but their proof is the difference faith makes to Christians' lives. Christians believe what they have heard in preaching, and in the Christ whose resurrection is made manifest in their lives.
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Those who hold Jesus's maleness as historically and theologically incontrovertible fact are not usually arguing what Bultmann does, namely, that the fact or otherwise of Jesus's historical maleness is less significant than the beliefs and faith that have grown up around it. This might be a more honest position. Rather, those who argue that women should not be made bishops because of their femaleness frequently appeal to Jesus's historic maleness (assumed to be unproblematic in biological terms), even though such maleness is not historically attestable. There might be good theological reasons for wanting to maintain the importance of Jesus's historicity and particularity in a way Bultmann does not. However, his point about the unknowability of certain historical information still stands, and problematizes biologist assertions about humans' sex as imaging God.
The Christian avowal of Jesus's simultaneous humanity and divinity holds mystery. How do these qualities coexist? At what point did Jesus, the human child, come into his full God-consciousness? Christian theologies' dual appeals to the centrality of Jesus's actual, physical body-the proof of incarnationand to the cosmic-ecclesial body into which Christians are initiated, means that there is a capacity for uncertainty and simultaneity built into the tradition. But uncertainty and simultaneity can be uncomfortable to live with. Christians have often preferred assurance and conviction. The projection of this certainty onto questions of sex and gender has led to an over-theologization of certain human institutions (such as heterosexual marriage) as exclusively mirroring aspects of divine relationality, and a disavowal of provisionality and apophasis (though these latter have begun to be reclaimed in, for example, some feminist and queer theological accounts). But insisting on hesitation, on an active refusal to be certain, is particularly significant when it comes to Jesus's maleness, because it is the uncertain nature of this maleness that continues to be denied-to the extent that its assumed incontrovertibility is made a ground for denying women's priestly and episcopal ministry in ontological terms.
Fascinatingly, Barth himself owns, "an impenetrable veil of silence lies over the fact that [Jesus] was a male. . . . The fact of His corporeality is crucially important. The substance and nature of this fact, which are so desirable and even necessary to a biographer, remain fundamentally hidden." 53 For Rachel Muers, this is significant because despite Barth's insistence that to be human is to be sexed male or female, Jesus the superhuman (and model for all humans) some-how transcends sex. 54 Sex is relativized. Barth himself, who accounts human maleness and femaleness as irreducibly part of what allows human relationships to repeat divine-human ones, is admitting that the nature of Jesus's maleness is itself less certain or incontrovertible than it might seem. Bring on the doubt! Jesus's historic physical maleness might simply have to be something Christians say less about in theological terms; something to which they attach less significance and in which they ground fewer theological and ecclesial suppositions.
Many opponents of women's ordination as priests and consecration as bishops maintain that there must be continuity between the (physical) maleness of Christ and the (physical) maleness of the human being in persona Christi. For most such commentators, Christ's maleness seems self-evident and indisputable. Arguments that gender is constructed and that the differences between men and women are minimal are unlikely to be convincing for those who insist that the ontological differences are grounded in biology, and that it is on biology that gender identity must supervene. In this paper, however, I have argued, first, that maleness cannot be part of that of God imaged in Jesus (since sex is a human characteristic and not a divine one), so it also need not be part of that of Jesus which priests "represent"; and, second, that even if the putative sex of God were imaged in Christ, it is not possible in historic terms to be certain that Jesus's biological body was a male one, so it also does not make sense to insist that "Christness" can only be represented in male bodies.
There are certain things we cannot, at this juncture, know about Jesus's physical sex. But no sex's significance is unproblematic or self-evident, since the ways we interpret sex and the significance we ascribe to it-even when we think we are just reading the bare biological facts of someone's body-always depend on a host of other circumstances, such as the norms and conventions of sex in currency in our own context. There is no such thing as an unvarnished certainty that Jesus was male as we now define maleness. This does not make the specificities of human sex insignificant (as Barth and contemporary opponents to women's priesthood and consecration as bishops seem to fear will happen): indeed, it makes the acknowledgment of the diverse ways in which human sex manifests-including the existence of intersex-even more important. Denying the real sexed existence of those "sexed otherwise" is to undermine their full humanity and shared status as created in God's image. Human beings are not exclusively male or female, even if the Church of England and other denominations continue to insist otherwise. The existence of intersex, and the history of its analysis and treatment in medical, social, and theological discourse, is a reminder that even "self-evident," "obvious" accounts of what it means to be human can and do change.
